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This study analyzes the effect on performance when incorporating ESG principles into the 
130/30 active extension investment strategy. By setting exposure to 130% for the long position 
of high-ESG-ranking stocks, and a 30% exposure for the short position of low-ESG-ranking 
stocks, positive and statistically significant abnormal returns of up to 8.532% can be achieved. 
However, the short position of this strategy generated a negative performance contribution, and 
the 130/30 strategy is not a statistically significant improvement to the long-only strategy. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to slightly improve the information ratio when changing the 
long-short exposure and cut-off points. 
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1. Introduction  
Looking after the environment, plus issues of equality, ethnicity and governmental 
responsibility, have become hot topics in this day and age, gaining increasing importance and 
interest. In the finance industry, ESG standards have begun to influence investing activities 
that are interested in social, and financial value. These indicators are used to assess business 
practice sustainability from an environmental, societal, and corporate governmental 
perspective. Nowadays, more and more investors are taking ESG criteria into account in 
investment decisions, alongside financial performance, in order to mitigate risks, whilst also 
creating long-term value. To this date, previous studies have not given a consistent conclusion 
about the relationship between ESG scores and stock performance. 
Several studies have enforced a long-only strategy, and a long-short market-neutral strategy, 
based on the screening approach (Kempf and Osthoff 2007; Derwall et al. 2005; Dorfleitner, 
Utz, and Wimmer 2013), to evaluate the abnormal returns of responsible investing. Such 
studies have shown notable results in terms of financial performance linked to ESG factor 
exposure. Yet, Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horst (2011) and Halbritter and Dorfleitner (2015), 
suggest that ESG investing will not be profitable in the long run. In the meantime, ESG 
concerned investors generally exclude low ESG performing stocks and “sin” stocks, restricting 
both available investment options, and realized returns, while leading to information loss. All 
things considered, this study aims to find an alternative investment strategy to boost ESG 
performance by including this underutilized information.  
The argument is that the 130/30 strategy - a typical active-extension strategy - may be an 
effective approach to improve current ESG issues. It serves as an alternative to long-only funds 
by considering excluded companies in the short position as a possible way to enhance alpha. 
Simultaneously, increased long-side exposure, enables high ESG ranked companies to further 
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boost alpha and mitigate the risk of stock shorting. By doing so, information efficiency may be 
improved, whilst remaining market exposure is unchanged. 
The 130/30 strategy is one of the fastest-growing strategies within the hedge fund industry.  
Suppose a portfolio manager invests $100 in the stock market, then shorts $30 of unattractive 
stocks. Then, gains from that short sale are used to purchase an additional $30 in those attractive 
stocks. With these operations, the manager ends up with 130% long exposure and a 30% short 
exposure, with a net market exposure of 100%, which is equal to the $100 actually invested.  
This strategy has been successfully applied in the stock market but is relatively unexplored in 
ESG investigation. This thesis performs empirical analysis on this research gap. It investigates 
the implementation of a 130/30 active-extension strategy with ESG principles. A long-only 
portfolio and 130/30 portfolios was constructed based on overall ESG scores through negative 
screening. Then, each individual dimension E, S, and G, were screened in a robustness test. 
Based on the findings of this project, it is apparent that, although all 130/30 portfolios 
outperform the benchmark, the short position of bottom rated stocks has a negative effect on 
performance. This could yield a significant yearly abnormal return of up to 8.532%. Yet, the 
130/30 strategy is not a statistically significant improvement to the long-only strategy. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to slightly improve the information ratio when changing the 
long-short exposure and cut-offs.  
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Responsible Investing 
Over the past decade, comprehensive literature and specialists on responsible investing, have 
emphasized the incorporation of the ESG approach into investment decisions in order to 
minimize the portfolio downside risks, (Kumar et al. 2016; Berg and Lange 2020) while 
seeking abnormal returns. This viewpoint is supported by the “doing well while doing well” 
hypothesis (Statman and Glushkov 2009), in which companies with higher ESG ratings are 
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predicted to achieve greater financial performance than their peers. In accordance with this 
hypothesis, Kempf and Osthoff (2007) established an abnormal return of up to 8.7% per year 
by implementing a long-short investment strategy on a portfolio with high ESG metrics and 
selling stocks in a lower rank on the U.S. portfolio, from 1992 to 2004. Furthermore, the studies 
show that responsible portfolios are tilted towards higher ESG rated stocks, as well as 
approximating the three socially responsible dimensions, which are: community, employee 
relations and environment. Statman (2009) reinforced Kempf ´s (2007) findings. Empirically, 
another explanation that could evaluate this phenomenon is that the stock market does not 
sufficiently recognize the value effects of ESG. Thus, investment in these businesses may also 
offer investors unexpected surprises (Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horsk 2011; Halbritter and 
Dorfleitner 2015). 
Whilst there is evidence that companies with good ESG qualities can be financially rewarding, 
the limitation of selection requirements and the cost of narrowing down such industries via 
negative screening, may contribute to a lack of portfolio diversification. Several empirical 
studies have indicated that there is no statistically significant evidence that SRI generates 
abnormal returns - most of them clarified this phenomenon by financial behaviour. In line with 
this argument, Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horsk (2011) discussed the "shunned-stock" 
hypothesis. He argued that value-driven investors remove low-ESG rated companies, as well 
as controversial companies, to meet their ethical standards. However, this “shortage of demand” 
for irresponsible stocks may lead them to become underpriced. Furthermore, the smaller 
investor base means a large risk-sharing opportunity in the market for shunned stocks, leading 
to a return premium (Merton 1987; Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001). Consistent with this 
finding, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) especially, claimed that these, so-called, "sin" stocks 
capture this premium in their risk adjusted return. With this in mind, Statman and Glushkov 
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(2009), further observed that, even though stocks with high SRI ratings outperformed low 
rating stocks, their benefit is partially offset by the drawback of removing shunned companies. 
2.2. Active extension strategy 
Active extension strategies are a benchmark-relative strategy aimed to increase exposure to the 
alpha model in order to outperform a benchmark by relaxing the long-only constraint, whilst, 
having a similar net market exposure as a long-only fund. The emergence of active extension 
strategies has been derived from the intrinsic drawbacks of a long-only strategy - low capability 
to either over weigh the attractive stocks, or under weigh the unattractive ones. This argument 
is well documented as the loss of efficiency of the long-only constraint by Jacobs, Levy, and 
Starer (1998). Grinold and Kahn (2000) and Clarke, Harindra, and Steven (2004), both stand 
by this argument, showing that removing this constraint can lead to a substantial improvement 
in information efficiency, as measured by the information ratio (IR). Furthermore, Johnson, 
Ericson, and Srimurthy (2007) suggested an approach to performance attribution. The 
conclusion drawn was that this improvement was due to a rise in alpha levels without adding 
much incremental risk. 
When comparing with the long-short strategy, the active extension strategy has the advantage 
of 100% net market exposure. This is more comparable with a long-only strategy and can be 
measured using the same benchmark (Waid 2009; Jacobs and Levy 2007). Therefore, the active 
extension strategy can be measured by relative return and risk-adjusted performance, rather 
than absolute return, limiting unexpected risk occurring when following a normal long-short 
strategy. Nevertheless, there are two main drawbacks: leverage risk – unlimited losses on the 
short position (Jacobs and Levy 2006; Brush 1997) and high expenses – leverage costs, 
transaction costs and management fees (Sorensen, Hua, and Qian 2007). 
2.3 Active extension strategies in ESG 
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Investors aligned with ESG investing criteria often avoid holding “sin” stocks and stocks with 
a poor ESG ranking. By using the active extension strategy, a portfolio can still avoid having 
a long position in poorly ranked ESG firms, while allowing the shorting of those screened 
stocks to finance the long position to overweight top-ranked stocks. It may help performance 
and mitigate shorting risk. By doing so, the shorting position is crucial for implementing the 
130/30 strategy into ESG investing. However, low ESG scoring shorted stocks are currently a 
controversial topic in both responsible investing and the stock market (Strauss, Pekin, and 
Strauss 2017; Jacobs and Levy 2006; Clarke, Harindra, and Steven 2004; Gastineau 2008). The 
article of Citywire (2019), widely discussed the predicament of shorting poor ESG companies 
based on an ethical perspective. Conversely, Strauss, Pekin, and Strauss (2017) argued that 
allowing the shorting of poorly ranked ESG companies would help performance, whilst also 
showing a wider expression of an investor´s views on management. In other words, the shorting 
of these stocks could be seen as a sign from investors that the public is not satisfied with these 
firms’ approach to ESG responsibility. This presents an interesting picture, where the value of 
stocks may not only be perceived based on financial metrics, but also by societal and ethical 
values. Unexpectedly, the Strauss, Pekin, and Strauss (2017)’s result showed a negative 
performance contribution due to “stock price momentum and spiking borrowing costs”. 
Therefore, when selecting stocks for a short position for the 130/30 ESG investing strategy, 
risk management and adequate management of turnovers are crucial. 
To date, whilst several researchers have explored the effect on financial performance when 
implementing active extension strategies in the equity market, few studies have investigated 
this strategy with ESG factors. Among them, Filbeck, Holzhauer, and Zhao (2014), especially, 
studied the 130/30 active extension in responsible investing for the entire U.S. market, which 
is comprised by the Domini 400 Social Index and the S&P 500. They designed three long-only 
portfolios and three 130/30 portfolios by comparing the information ratio and abnormal returns. 
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The results show that all portfolios generated statistically significant abnormal returns, where 
130/30 portfolios outperformed the long-only portfolios, generating a higher information ratio. 
Another finding of this research suggests that employing 130/30 strategies that include stocks 
from both high-ranking score companies, and shunned ones, may generate alpha. 
This thesis primarily takes inspiration from the previous literature of Kempf and Osthoff (2007), 
Filbeck, Holzhauer, and Zhao (2014) and Johnson, Ericson, and Srimurthy (2007) and is 
dedicated to large firms within the S&P 500 index. Contrary to Filbeck, Holzhauer, and Zhao’s 
(2014) study, in this study, a negative screening on overall ESG score includes shunned stocks 
in the short position, as well as individual pillar E, S and G screenings. Taking note from their 
research, an empirical analysis, namely the mean alpha difference test, is used to confirm 
whether the outperformance, or underperformance, is statistically significant or not.  
My study provides a view for portfolio managers, from an empirical perspective, on developing 
an active extension strategy on the ESG investing. The purpose of this study is to find a trade-
off between the conventional, long-only strategy and the long-short strategy, whilst 
maintaining positive returns and mitigated risk.  
Taking into account that an inverse relationship is expected between top ESG firms in the long 
position, and bottom rating firms in the short position. Over the long-term, three hypotheses 
have been formulated. 1) All of the 130/30 portfolios will statistically outperform the 
benchmark. This hypothesis is to test whether ESG investing will generate a higher return by 
implementing an active extension strategy. 2) All 130/30 portfolios will show a statistically 
significant improvement when compared to the portfolio with the long-only strategy. This 
hypothesis is committed to investigate the potential benefits of relaxing the long-only 
constraint. 3) Whether the short position adds value or loss. This hypothesis is intended to study 
the performance contribution by trading screened companies. 
3. Data 
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3.1 ESG metric 
The ESG is a multidimensional notion (Galema, Plantinga, and Scholtens 2008) that stands for 
environmental, governmental, and social, and its rating can be viewed as a collection of metrics 
for measuring the extra-financial ESG performance. ACCF (2018) is dedicated to the study of 
ESG ratings and revealed some primary issues related to ESG scores. They noted that, since 
ESG data providers use a wide variety of methodologies and techniques to quantify ESG scores, 
“one company can carry divergent scores and rankings from different providers simultaneously” 
(ACCF 2018). Therefore, lack of a common rating method and inconsistency between ESG 
rating providers, (Chatterji et al. 2016; Halbritter and Dorfleitner 2015; Dorfleitner, Halbritter, 
and Nguyen 2015) could confuse the ratings. Meanwhile, investors must ensure that the rating 
method is aligned with their specific ESG preferences. In addition, ESG ratings have presented 
strong evidence of a systematic correlation with the size, geographic and industry of a firm 
(Kotsantonis and Serafeim 2019; Drempetic, Klein, and Zwergel 2020). Such characteristics 
have been proven as the cross-sectional determinants of stock return which constitutes a 
potential bias. 
3.2 Data sample 
The primary data source of this thesis is an ESG database provided by MSCI (KLD), and 
financial performance measures from Bloomberg. The MSCI ESG ratings is the broadest 
existing dataset on ESG matters and is widely used in academic research (Kempf and Osthoff 
2007; Galema, Plantinga, and Scholtens 2008; Mǎnescu 2011). The MSCI ESG scores are the 
combined performance of seven components, which are summarized into the following three 
dimensions: First, E represents Environment. Second, S is Social, which is then broken down 
into five sub-dimensions, being: Community, Diversity, Employee Relations, Human Rights, 
and Products. Finally, G stands for Governance. The aggregated scores are derived from a 
subset of more than 80 indicators, which are annually measured by strengths and concerns 
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based on a binary scoring model, i.e., giving score of “1” if a strength or concern is present, 
otherwise “0”. 
This thesis followed the method of Kempf and Osthoff (2007) to compute company´s ESG 
score, converting all concerns into strengths, by taking the opposite binary value. The overall 
strengths for each of the dimensions were summed up and normalized between 0 and 1. For 
the final ESG score, each dimension was given an equal weight. Apart from these seven themes, 
the MSCI has exclusionary screens for alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power 
and tobacco. Given the nature of these screens, I define all companies with the presence of 
these metrics as “shunned stocks.” The financial dataset is taken from in the U.S. market, 
comprised of all companies from the S&P 500, from 1991, to 2016, on a monthly basis. 
According to Waid (2009) “the long-only benchmark is the natural choice to measure the active 
extension manager skill.” The S&P500 was selected for the benchmark of this study, as it is 
the most commonly used U.S. benchmark index. 
In order to match MSCI ESG data with financial data, each firms CUSIPs code, ticker, name 
and year were used to identify firms that were in both the S&P 500 list, and the MSCI database, 
while eliminating firms without return records in the S&P 500 index in the corresponding year. 
The study yields 465 firms fulfilled this condition aggregated into eleven sectors, with 7,586 
company-year observations for a full sample from 1991 to 2016. Among the 465 companies, 
132 are shunned stocks, consisting of 1,337 observations. The remaining 6,249 observations 
are defined as non-controversial stocks, which is made up of 420 companies (Exhibit 1) 
Exhibit 1- Summary statistic of the sample portfolio for overall ESG score 
Overall ESG score Firms N Mean SD Kurtosis Skewness Min Max 
Full sample 465 7586 0.464 0.095 0.301 -0.184 0.125 0.846 
Shunned sample 132 1337 0.449 0.100 0.029 0.201 0.190 0.835 
Non-controversial sample 420 6249 0.468 0.093 0.438 -0.271 0.125 0.846 
The discrepancy between accepted samples and controversial samples is that, during the 26-year timeline, some companies are 
considered as shunned stocks during specific periods and are viewed as non-controversial for others.  
ESG is comprised of three individual dimensions; E, S and G. Exhibit 2 shows that the trend 
of all scores have increased over the past 26 years, with the exception of the significant 
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downturn in 2010 due to the varying total number of metrics and improvements in the ranking 
methodology in 2010. Exhibit 3 revealed the distribution for the total ESG score and three 
dimensions. The database composition is mostly clustered in a range of scores between 0.2 and 
0.7.  
  Exhibit 2: ESG score evolution.                                   Exhibit 3: Distribution of ESG scores of firms 
 
Table 1 (Appendix) provides data to illustrate the main ESG bias. Firstly, as the sample consists 
of large U.S. companies, the size bias is not concerning in this case. It can be seen in Table 1.1 
(Appendix), which shows the regression of firm’s ESG scores on the log of market 
capitalization. Although the sample showed significantly positive results, the loading is low 
(0.018) with an 𝑅! of only 0.086. Its relation is also relatively low in this study. The same can 
be said for criteria E and S. However, G, demonstrated a negative correlation with firm size (-
0.008), but with an 𝑅! of 0.015. Secondly, the best-in-class (industry adjusted) method, was 
the primary approach taken by previous research Filbeck, Holzhauer, and Zhao (2014) to 
eliminate the industry bias, which is especially useful when having a large data set. However, 
the database of this study is relatively small, and some industry, the energy and the real estate, 
are underrepresented in the S&P 500, especially in the early period, which can be seen in Table 
1.2 (Appendix). Hence, this approach is not used here. Finally, the sample represents a wide 
variety of industries, and the mean ESG scores of each industry are similar, all around 0.45.  
3.3 Portfolio formulation 
All samples and portfolios are constructed at the beginning of each year t, based on an MSCI 
score, which was reported at the end of each year t-1, by MSCI, with 1 year holding period and 
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rebalancing at the end of every year. There is a time series of monthly returns from the period 
of January 1992, to December 2017. For each month, the S&P 500 is used as a benchmark, and 
the selected stocks within the universe are used to construct the portfolios. The portfolios are 
on an equally weighted basis, which has the benefit of being simple, transparent and reducing 
single-stock concentration. As a result, it is more comparable across industries and firm sizes. 
This section begins by creating yearly rebalanced decile portfolios with the data from the non-
controversial sample, by sorting stocks based on their overall ESG score over 26 years, and 
matching rating deciles with stock returns. For negative screening (Table 2.1- Appendix), high 
overall ESG rating does not systematically reflect higher returns. Notably, the worst decile 10, 
showed the lowest return and Sharpe ratio, due to the higher risk, which aligns with our purpose 
of excluding the stocks with the worst ESG performance. For individual dimension score 
screening (Table 2.2A - Appendix), only the E score-based rating showed a similar pattern with 
the overall ESG score-based rating. However, all top sample portfolios have a higher Sharpe 
ratio than the bottom sample ones, due to a lower standard deviation. Based on these findings, 
it is safe to conclude that the higher performing ESG stocks did not systematically outperform 
the lower scoring ones. Instead, what can be confirmed, is that they have a lower level of risk. 
Furthermore, cross-sectional correlations between the ranking of the three dimensions were 
observed to be low, varying from 0.080 to 0.240 (Table 2.2B - Appendix). Unfortunately, this 
approach still possesses a bit of an industry bias, with Table 2.3 (Appendix) indicating the 
concentration in the worst-decile in the energy sector, and the best-decile in the finance one.  
Based on this information, 4 groups of top and bottom sample portfolios are drawn based on 4 
screening policies. The first is a negative screen applied to the overall ESG score, which 
combines the scores of the 3 dimensions. Under this policy, with the exception of the shunned 
sample, the non-controversial sample is further divided into 2 sub-sample portfolios. The top 
sample is defined as the top 3 deciles, due to similar levels of return and risk. The bottom 
 12 
sample is the worst decile (10%). The remaining three individual dimensional screens 
followed a similar pattern, where the bottom sample is comprised of 10% of the worst scoring 
stocks. All remaining stocks are included in the top sample of each screen.   
3.4 Methodology 
This thesis compares the financial performance of an active extension strategy to that of a 
benchmark and long-only strategy by considering long-term, relative return performance.  
Henceforth, the active extension strategy is explicitly referred to as the 130/30 strategy, which 
places the long and short position leverage level, to 130% and 30%, respectively. Following 
this procedure, 10 strategy portfolios with a long-only, and a 130/30 strategy, are formulated 
based on 4 screenings: 
1) Four long top-only portfolios for each of the 4 screenings: 100% exposure in the long 
position for the top sample of each screening. 
2) Four 130/30, top-bottom, (130/30 TB) portfolios for each of the 4 screenings: 130% 
exposure in the long position for the top sample, and 30% exposure in the short position 
for the bottom sample of each screening.  
3) One 130/30, top-shunned, (130/30 TS) portfolio for the negative screening: 130% 
exposure in the long position for the top sample, and 30% exposure in the short position 
for the shunned sample. 
4) One 130/30, top-bottom-shunned, (130/30 TBS) portfolio for negative screening: 130% 
exposure in the long position for the top sample, and 30% exposure in the short position 
for the bottom and controversial samples.  
The structure of the performance analysis is primarily segregated into several stages. The 
analysis process started by studying the return performance of portfolios for both the 130/30 
and long-only strategies for the aggregated ESG score portfolio, which is dedicated to study 
hypothesis 1. Secondly, a variety of return and risk-adjusted performance analysis, especially 
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focusing on the information ratio (IR), which can directly answer hypothesis 2. Thirdly, the 
significant difference in the portfolio’s Jensen´s alpha is tested in order to further verify the 
crystallization taken from the IR. Fourthly, to determine whether the short positions of the 
130/30 portfolios add value or loss, this study addresses the third hypothesis. In the case of 
losses, it is investigated whether the benefits from the long position can bear the losses from 
the short one in the 130/30 portfolios. Finally, multi-factor models were employed, to assure 
the validity of performance. In addition, the robustness test is proceeded by several criteria to 
assess the sensitivity of results. Firstly, the top portfolio cut-off point of overall ESG is 
increased to capture the flexibility and diversification in the long portion. Secondly, the entire 
performance analysis process is repeated for each individual E, S and G screening. In terms of 
the 130/30 strategy, scenario analysis 110/10, 120/20, 130/30, 140/40 and 150/50, are tested to 
find the best proportion of active exposure based on risk and return.  
3.5 Performance measurement 
1) The Sharpe Ratio (SR) (Sharpe 1966,1994) is defined as the excess return of the portfolio 
divided by the volatility measured via the standard deviation. The higher the Sharpe ratio, the 
better the combination of risk and return, which represents the incremental risk-adjusted return 
per unit of incremental risk.  
𝑆𝑅 = 	 "#$!%$"&
'	
								                                                   (1) 
Where 𝑟( denotes the portfolio return, 𝑟) represents the risk-free return, and 𝜎	 represents the 
standard deviation of the monthly excess return.  
2) Skewness is the degree of distortion from the normal distribution that measures the lack of 
symmetry in data distribution. Kurtosis, on the other hand, measures the weight of returns in 
the tails of the distribution. Whenever the skewness is near 0, and kurtosis near 3, the Bera-
Jarque test is used to test for normality. 
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3) The Adjusted Sharpe Ratio (ASR) (Pézier and White 2008), overcomes the deficiency of 
the Sharpe Ratio - which only works under the assumption of normally distributed returns, by 
incorporating a penalty factor for negative skewness and excess kurtosis. 
𝐴𝑆𝑅( = 𝑆𝑅( 	 (1 + +
+,-.
/
, 𝑆𝑅( − (
012
!3
)	𝑆𝑅(!0                                (2) 
4) The Treynor ratio (TR) (Treynor, 1966) is similar to the Sharpe ratio. The difference, 
however, is that it measures the return per unit of systematic risk, as calculated by beta, 
instead of total risk. However, this measurement is less frequently used for performance 
analysis as it ignores specific risk. 
𝑇𝑅 = 	 "#$!%$"&
4!	
																				        													        			          (3) 
Where systematic risk 𝛽(	 is the regression of the monthly excess returns for the portfolio 
against market excess returns. 
5) The Information Ratio is active returns, divided by its tracking error. The numerator is the 
excess return of the portfolio compared to the selected benchmark (S&P 500). The denominator 
is the standard deviation of this excess return. The information ratio is the incremental risk-
adjusted active return per unit of incremental active risk. It is one of the key metrics used to 
measure the skill of an active portfolio manager. 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 	 $!%$$
'	
                                       (4) 
Where 𝑅5 denotes the return of benchmark. 
6) The Alpha - Jensen´s alpha (Jensen 1968) is used as a measurement of portfolio abnormal 
returns, which is the intercept of the regression equation in the CAPM for excess portfolio 
returns portfolio, against excess returns adjusted for systematic risk. 
 𝛼( = 𝑅(6 − 𝑅)6 + 𝛽(<𝑅76 − 𝑅)6=                                  (5) 
7) The Long and short Contribution is used to identify whether the long and short positions 
generate value or produce a loss, in comparison with the benchmark. The formula calculation 
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is inspired by (Johnson, Ericson, and Srimurthy 2007). The contribution of portfolio excess 
returns from the long portion, 𝐶8(6, is as follows: 
𝐶8(6 = (𝑅8(6-𝑅56) × 𝑊8(                                                  (8) 
The contribution of portfolio excess returns from the short portion, 𝐶8(6, is as follows: 
𝐶+(6 = (𝑅+(6-𝑅56) × 𝑊+(                                                    (9) 
Where 𝑅8(6, 𝑅+(6 and 𝑅56 stand for the returns from the long portion, the short portion of the 
portfolio, and the benchmark at time t, respectively. 𝑊8( and 𝑊+( denote the long and short 
exposure position of the portfolio, which is 1.3 (130%), and 0.3 (30%), respectively. 
8) The Fama-French (1992) three-factor model evaluates the abnormal returns of the long-
only and 130/30 portfolios by considering market return, size, and value factors (equation 6). 
Carhart´s (1997) four-factor model, inspired by (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) one-year 
momentum anomaly, is obtained by adding the momentum factor to the three-factor model. 
                 𝑅(6 − 𝑅)6 = 𝛼( + 𝛽9(<𝑅76 − 𝑅)6= + 𝛽!(𝑆𝑀𝐵6 + 𝛽:(𝐻𝑀𝐿6 +	𝑒(6                     (6) 
         𝑅(6 − 𝑅)6 = 𝛼( + 𝛽9(<𝑅76 − 𝑅)6= + 𝛽!(𝑆𝑀𝐵6 + 𝛽:(𝐻𝑀𝐿6 + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑂𝑀6 +	𝑒(6							  (7) 
The dependent variable is the monthly excess return of portfolio p, for month t, over the risk-
free rate. The independent variables are the returns of three factor portfolios. 𝑅76 − 𝑅)6 is the 
excess return of the market portfolio. 𝑆𝑀𝐵6 is the size factor, 𝐻𝑀𝐿6 is the factor, and 𝑀𝑂𝑀6	is 
the momentum factor.  
4. Empirical Result 
4.1 Return performance  




































































































































As can be observed in Exhibit 4, both long-top only, and 130/30 portfolios, outperform the 
benchmark S&P 500 over the 26-year test period. Furthermore, all 130/30 portfolios slightly 
outperform the respective long top-only portfolio. These results provide evidence of a possible 
investment return enhancement by allowing a reasonable amount of shorting, and a long-only 
constraint extension. In more detail, Table 3 (Appendix) summarizes the return and risk-
adjusted performance of portfolios for the aggregated ESG score. As reported in Table 3A 
(Appendix), the 130/30 top-bottom and 130/30 top-bottom-shunned portfolios provide the 
highest annualized basis returns, of 15.782% and 15.161%, respectively, when compared with 
the benchmark, which has 7.407%. As mentioned in the literature review, the portfolio´s 
performance of both strategies should be evaluated against the benchmark, rather than absolute 
returns. Hence, relative performance is used. The result indicates that all portfolios from both 
strategies generate statistically positive returns when confronting the benchmark. However, the 
same cannot be stated when comparing the relative returns of the 130/30 portfolios with its 
counterpart – the long top-only portfolio. While the 130/30 portfolios produce an annualized 
relative return of approximately 8% - roughly 1% higher than the returns of the long top-only 
strategy, this difference is not statistically different.  
4.2 Risk-adjusted performance and Alpha comparison 
(Table 3B – Appendix) In terms of risk-adjusted measurements, the Sharpe ratio and Treynor 
ratio generated by long top-only, and 130/30 portfolios, were larger than the benchmark around 
2 times in ratio. However, consistent with the result of the Benchmark, both strategies showed 
negative skewedness and positive excess kurtosis. As for the result of the Jarque-Bera test, the 
normality assumption was rejected. Therefore, the Adjusted Sharpe Ratio is used. Although 
the ASR is lower than the Sharpe Ratio, it is still much higher than the benchmark´s. When 
evaluated on relative risk-adjusted performance, the information ratio for both strategies is 
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positive against the benchmark. Unfortunately, the 130/30 strategy underperforms the long top-
only strategy, as seen in Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6. The information ratio of all 130/30 portfolios 
is slightly lower than the long top-only portfolio. This is likely due to the fact that the 
proportionate increase in risk for the 130/30 strategy, when compared to the long-only strategy, 
is higher than the increase of active returns. The risk is measured by tracking errors, that 
increased by around 16% on the 130/30 portfolios, by taking the short position and relaxing 
the long-only constraint. This circumstance shows that relaxing the long-only constraint’s yield 
to a higher return is associated with substantial added risk.  
   Exhibit 5: Comparison of information ratio (IR).           Exhibit 6: Information ratio and alpha model 
 
Regarding Jensen´s alpha result Exhibit 6, there is a strong evidence that both strategies 
outperformed the benchmark on a monthly alpha basis. However, the difference of monthly 
alpha generated between the 130/30 portfolios and the long top-only portfolio is not statistically 
significant. For instance, the p-value was used in the t-test for the difference of the 130/30 top-
bottom portfolio monthly alpha results of 0.660%, and the long top-only portfolio result, of 
0.561%, is 0.53 which is significantly higher than 0.05 of the significance level. This result 
fortifies the information ratio and cumulative relative return comparisons. Hence, these three 
findings show that there is no statistically significant improvement in alpha by relaxing long-
only constraints in the ESG investing. 
4.3 Performance contributions 
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In this segment, relative performance is broken down into three contributions, the long position, 
the short position, and the long-short interaction, respectively. Considering all three 130/30 
portfolios showed similar results, focus will be placed on the 130/30 top-bottom-shunned 
portfolio (130/30 TBS) in order to proceed with further analysis in the following sections of 
this dissertation. Equations 8 and 9 are applied on the annualized compounded returns 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. Overall, during the time period in analysis, 130/30 
strategy returns had a compounded annualized average of 15.161% over the entire 26-year 
period, outperforming the S&P 500 by 7.754%. The positive contribution of the portfolio´s 
long portion has solely achieved this performance gain. It can be verified in Table 4 (Appendix), 
that the long position of the portfolio exceeded the benchmark. Thus, it contributed 9.142% to 
the portfolio’s overall excess return. Conversely, the short side generated a positive return that 
surpassed benchmark returns by 4.310%, leading to a negative contribution of 1.293%, with 
30% exposure. This reduced the overall portfolio from 9.142% to 7.849% 
Exhibit 7: Annual compounded relative returns of 130/30 TBS and long top-only portfolio 
In the perspective of annual performance, the long position resulted in a positive contribution 
for 22 years. For the short position, out of 26 years, only 6 were positive ones (Table 4 – 
Appendix). Exhibit 7 demonstrates that, for most of the years, the short positions of the 130/30 
portfolios produce a negative value. In this instance, 3 years of these losses cannot be 
compensated by the long side of the portfolio. These findings point to the conclusion that the 
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short position, far from benefiting the performance, is diminishing it. Even so, this perspective 
ignores several short position advantages. Apart from the benefit of a beta close to 1 and a 100% 
portfolio exposure, the short position does not only enable the portfolio to diversify the stock 
selection, but also the portfolio becomes more versatile in taking more active risks on long 
positions.  
Although the increase of flexibility leads to the potential to add value from a long position, 
Table 5 (Appendix) shows that 130/30 strategies underperformed the long-only strategy in 9 
out of the 26 years, the result remains low. This is due to the poor contribution from the short 
position, and the 130/30´s overall return is not significantly different from the long top-only 
portfolio. 
This thesis argues that implementing the 130/30 strategy in ESG investing generates loss in the 
short position of low ESG performance and shunned stocks, and this loss cannot be efficiently 
managed to be compensated by the stocks with higher ESG rating. This inefficient alpha 
generation from the short portion, leads to no statistically significant difference, and achieves 
a lower information ratio than the long-only strategy, 
4.4 Multifactor analysis 
Table 6 (Appendix) demonstrates the performance measurements of the (Fama and French 
1992) three-factor, and (Carhart 1997) four-factor regressions on the 4 portfolios from the long-
only strategy and 130/30 strategy. All portfolios showed a significant outperformance at a 
significance level of 5%, 10% and 1%. The generally higher abnormal return is especially 
notable in 130/30 strategy portfolios. The 130/30 top-bottom portfolio generates the highest 
monthly alpha in three-factor and four-factor regressions compared to the long top-only 
portfolio. However, the alpha of the two strategies is not statistically significantly different. 
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This result assures the previous finding that there is no statistical improvement in the 130/30 
strategy against long-only strategy. 
Regarding the three-factor loadings, there are no notable differences between the beta of both 
strategies, and all portfolios exhibit significant positive factors. The output indicated that in the 
portfolio companies tend to be value companies and small size. This can be the effect of an 
equally weighted portfolio construction. The momentum factor is nearly zero, with no evidence 
of strong statistical significance. Moreover, at least 80% of the observed variations could be 
explained by the model´s input, as demonstrated by the high 𝑅!.  
5. Robustness test  
5.1 Alternative cut-offs 
Table 7A (Appendix) shows the performance comparison between 2 cut-offs of the top sample 
on overall ESG score. Cut-off of the top sample was increased from 30% of best ESG 
performance companies, to 90% of best-ranked companies within the non-controversial sample. 
This new top portfolio is defined as the long 90% top portfolio for the long top-only strategy, 
and 130/30 90% top-bottom-shunned portfolio (130/30 TBS) for the 130/30 strategy. The 
overall performance of the new cut-off is obviously improved. Under a new cut-off, the 
information ratio of the 130/30 portfolio sharply increased to a similar level as the long top-
only portfolio, which is 0.401 and 0.395, respectively. However, the difference of return is not 
statistically significant. While comparing to the former cut-off of the 30% top portfolio, both 
the tracking error and active returns are significant improved. Therefore, increased stocks in 
the top sample take advantage of diversification, which leads to lower risk and increase returns. 
5.2 Individual E, S and G screening 
The same analysis process of the overall ESG score was applied to each individual E, S and G 
dimensions for both strategies. The portfolio formulation was explained in the 3. Data session. 
The performance measures for E, S and G based rankings are given in Table 7B (Appendix). 
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Overall, all portfolios of the three dimensions outperformed the benchmark by generating 
superior returns over the 26-year holding period. Among these dimensions, E ranked portfolios 
exhibit a performance pattern similar to the overall ESG portfolios. On the contrary, S and G 
ranked 130/30 portfolios, both generated slightly lower relative returns than their respective 
long top-only portfolio counterparty. G presented the worst performance compared to E and S, 
contributing the lowest returns and the highest tracking errors, which leads to a monthly 
information ratio of 0.170 for the 130/30 strategy. This finding illustrates the underperformance 
of the 130/30 strategy against the long top-only strategy in terms of individual dimension 
screening. This evidence is especially highlighted on social, and governance ranked approaches. 
5.3 Alternative active weight 
For both the overall ESG score, and the individual dimension ranking, a scenario analysis was 
constructed for alternative active extension portfolio by changing the long and short exposure 
to 110/10, 120/20, 140/40 and 150/50.  






Exhibit 8 shows the monthly basis tracking error, alpha and information ratios graphs for the 
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and 10% short exposure, which generates a superior information ratio than the 130/30 portfolio 
but is still slightly lower than the long top-only portfolio. Notably, the 90% top sample provides 
much better performance than the top 30% sample amongst the 5 long-short weight scenarios. 
For 90% top sample cut-off, the 120/20 strategy delivered the best information ratio which is 
much higher than its long-only strategy counterpart.  Unfortunately, the alpha difference is not 
statistically different. All E, S, and G individual dimensions-based portfolios demonstrated 
similar patterns, where the 110/10 strategy is the best scenario that provides the highest 
information ratio among other active extension strategies. 
This finding illustrates that, the higher the active exposure on the long and short proportion, 
the better the performance of the portfolio in terms of returns. However, the risk increases as 
the alpha increases. Therefore, exploring the trade-off point between return and risk is crucial. 
Moreover, the different cut-offs are a vital variable in terms of the ability to bear the risk that 
comes with active exposure and generates higher abnormal returns. 
6. Discussion 
The present study was designed to evaluate a new active trading strategy for ESG investments 
with a view to ensuring the effectiveness of taking advantage of the shorting of those excluded 
stocks and examining the long side exposures. The idea behind this thesis was influenced by 
Filbeck, Holzhauer, and Zhao (2014), starting by the creation of multiple portfolios with an 
active 130/30 strategy and a long top-only strategy with ESG principles. 
Based on the 26 years of analysis collected, a significant excess return is discovered on all 
130/30 portfolios, relative to the standard portfolio, S&P 500. However, when comparing the 
relative return (against the benchmark) of the long top-only portfolio, in general, there is not a 
statistically significant difference. This result was further confirmed by analyzing risk-adjusted 
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performance, where all 130/30 portfolios have a lower information ratio than the long top-only 
portfolio, both in overall ESG score rankings, and individual dimensions-based rankings. 
Nonetheless, it is still possible to boost performance to generate a higher information ratio, for 
example, in the 120/20 or 110/10 strategy. The finding of this thesis contradicts Filbeck, 
Holzhauer, and Zhao’s (2014) previous study, which shows that all of their active extension 
portfolios are built by overall SR ratings, have a higher information ratio than their respective 
long top-only portfolios, and highlights the outperformance of active extension portfolios 
against both long top-only portfolios, and the benchmark. However, some reservations remain 
about this conclusion. Elaborating on Filbeck, Holzhauer, and Zhao’s study (2014), the 
significance test was further used to study the alpha comparison between both counterparty 
portfolios of the long top-only and the 130/30. The conclusion is that, whilst the 130/30 
portfolios produced a higher alpha than the long top-only portfolio, it is not statistically 
significantly different. The research of Johnson, Ericson, and Srimurthy (2007) supports this 
result. He argued that, instead of a lower tracking error, higher alpha in the 130/30 strategy 
should be the reason for the improvement of the information ratio. This argument is especially 
confirmed when the scenario analysis was proceeded, by increasing the active weight from 
110/10 to 150/50. The result highlight considering the trade-off of achieving higher return by 
active risk-taking. However, under the inefficiency alpha generation model, this work suggests 
that the improvement of the IR resulted from changing the active weight, and the cut-off point, 
as mentioned above, will not vary significantly. 
The active performance contribution is also studied. The result is in accordance with Lo and 
Patel’s (2008) 130/30 strategy study. It is noted that, although the 130/30 strategy delivered 
negative value-added in the short position, this short position may significantly boost the 
performance of the long proportion, which leads to outperforming the benchmark. However, 
when comparing with the long-only strategy, this negative contribution still cannot be managed 
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to overcome through the benefit of a long position on higher ESG ranking stocks. The reason 
behind this loss is due to the outperformance of those poorly ranked, especially shunned, stocks 
in the short position. This finding confirmed the argument of Statman and Glushkov (2009). 
Some financial behavior theory can further explain this phenomenon, as mentioned in the 
literature review (Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horsk 2011; Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Merton 
1987; Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001). 
This thesis provides a new perspective of the integration of an active extension strategy on the 
latest ESG literature. The active trading strategy for ESG investment was applied to negative 
screening and each individual dimension screening, by testing and decomposing the 
performance of returns, and risk measurement. The present results are significant in at least 
two major respects, the size bias control, and the statistic test for returns comparison between 
an active extension strategy, and a long-only strategy, which provide a more reliable outcome. 
Nevertheless, the scope of this study was constrained as it was tilted towards the industry bias, 
due to the selection of stocks by ESG ranking, which has been mentioned above. Another 
limitation is the lack of incorporation of the costs associated with the implementation of this 
trading strategy. This cost cannot be ignored, and generally includes transaction costs, short 
sales cost, management fee and additional performance fee (Sorensen, Hua, and Qian 2007). 
The level of cost varies according to the funds capitalization, the ability of the active manager, 
and variety among companies in the financial industry. 
7. Conclusion 
This study set out to find abnormal returns through the implementation of an active extension 
trading strategy by incorporating an ESG element. The results of this analysis provide strong 
evidence that the 130/30 strategy is a feasible strategy that outperforms the benchmark, 
producing higher abnormal returns of up to 8.532 percent per year (130/30 top 90% and bottom-
shunned portfolio). These findings suggest that eliminating the long-only constraint in stocks 
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with better ESG performance may diversify a portfolio, and increase its performance in the 
long portion, and somehow bear the loss from short positions due to the outperformance of 
those poorly score ranked stocks and shunned stocks (relative to the benchmark). Consequently, 
it leads to generate a significant positive active return. In the case of the individual social and 
governance screening rankings, in both screenings, low score rated portfolios produced higher 
returns than the benchmark and the top portfolios, leading the 130/30 portfolios to be 
underperformed compared to the long top-only portfolio. In the study of information ratio, and 
the overall alpha-generation analysis, the 130/30 strategy, cannot add meaningful value over 
the conventional long-only strategy. This consequence is primarily due to the insignificant 
boost in alpha. As the result, the gain of the 130/30 strategy is essentially offset by the negative 
performance contribution of the short position. Nevertheless, it is still possible slightly 
improve the information ratio when changing the long-short exposure and cut-offs. 
The insights obtained from this study may provide assistance to fund managers and ESG 
investment concerned investors. The results suggested that a further study could explore how 
to boost the efficiency of the short position on poor ESG performance companies to enable 
130/30 strategy to greatly outperform by the long-only strategy, which is the main question 
posed in this study. With this in mind, a combination of the other ESG investment approaches, 
and the active extension technique, rather than the screening method, would contribute to a 
greater performance outcome here. In addition, the study recommends that developing an 
optimal active extension portfolio, and risk management, should be carried out by high overall 
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Table 1. Data  
ESG bias - size bias and sector bias  
 
Table 1.1. The correlations between the firm size and score  




Table 1.2. Classified industry firms based on the industry classification benchmark 
  Number of firms Score across 26 years 
        ESG       
  1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2016 Mean Max Min E S G 
Communication 3 12 17 0.457 0.685 0.165 0.485 0.482 0.404 
C. Discretionary 15 35 40 0.461 0.769 0.125 0.487 0.468 0.428 
C. Staples 15 21 20 0.471 0.722 0.215 0.506 0.507 0.400 
Energy 4 15 21 0.430 0.697 0.178 0.404 0.448 0.438 
Financials 18 45 54 0.470 0.660 0.154 0.477 0.518 0.415 
Health Care 14 47 57 0.464 0.835 0.164 0.486 0.488 0.419 
Industrials 14 36 41 0.448 0.759 0.125 0.471 0.459 0.415 
Materials 10 18 17 0.448 0.698 0.189 0.446 0.470 0.428 
Real Estate 1 23 27 0.470 0.671 0.151 0.481 0.456 0.472 
Technology 7 40 54 0.493 0.846 0.164 0.521 0.532 0.426 
Utilities 0 5 9 0.448 0.712 0.202 0.410 0.484 0.449 
*C.Discretionary denotes consumer discretionary       


























Correlation between company size and ESG scores Correlation for overal ESG score and individual E, S and G score
Observations Slope R2
ESG 453 0.0178*** 0.0864
E 453 0.0393*** 0.1011
S 453 0.0214*** 0.0516
G 453 -0.0076** 0.0153
The scatterplot shows the ESG Score and market 
capitalization pairs, as well as the line of best fit. The data 
was set in 2016, as it has full data to run the regression.
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Table 2. Portfolio formulation  
 
Table 2.1. Non-controversial overall ESG score sample deciles portfolio risk-return             
 






Table 2.2. Top-bottom sample deciles portfolio risk-return 
        Table 2.2A: Decile portfolio risk-return Table 2.2B: Cross-sectional correlations  
    Firms N Return SD SR E S G 
Overal ESG               
  Top 269 20580 14.600% 14.700% 0.831    
  Bottom 201 6996 10.500% 16.900% 0.474    
  Controversial 132 16044 12.400% 14.800% 0.663    
Individual dimension         
E Top 443 70764 14.900% 15.100% 0.827 1 0.206 0.238 
  Bottom 355 20256 12.800% 15.300% 0.672 
S Top 461 74988 14.800% 14.900% 0.825 0.206 1 0.082 
  Bottom 299 13764 15.800% 16.500% 0.811 
G Top 463 77052 13.300% 15.200% 0.710 0.238 0.082 1 
  Bottom 282 13968 14.000% 16.400% 0.704 
N denotes the observations of the sample portfolio, and return is the compounded annual return. Table 2.2A shows 









































Decile portfolio risk-return of overall ESG score
Average Return (%) Std Dev (%) Sharpe Ratio
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Table 3. Strategy portfolio performance 
    Table 3A: Return Table 3B: Risk-return 
    Return t-dif 
Relative 
return t-dif SR TR Skew Kurt JB ASR 
Benchmark 7.407%***       0.118 0.005 -0.692 1.578 57.321 0.116 
Long only                     
  Long top-only 14.44%*** - 7.033%*** - 0.240 0.011 -0.389 2.084 64.291 0.235 
130/30                     
  130/30 TB 15.782%*** - 8.375%*** - 0.255 0.012 -0.237 1.854 47.59 0.251 
  130/30 TS 15.096%*** - 7.689%*** - 0.242 0.011 -0.322 1.643 40.474 0.238 
  130/30 TBS 15.161%*** - 7.754%*** - 0.244 0.011 -0.303 1.723 43.365 0.240 
The t-dif is the t test for the difference between the 130/30 portfolio and the long-top only portfolio. 
 a, b, and c indicate the statistical difference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 "-" indicates no statistically significant difference. 


























Percentage of firms distribution
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5
Portfolio 6 Portfolio 7 Portfolio 8 Portfolio 9 Portfolio 10
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Table 4. Performance contribution 
Portfolio of 130/30, top-bottom-shunned, (130/30 TBS)  
  Long-Only  130/30 TBS Long C Short C Interaction 
1992 19.375% 23.272% 25.187% -1.97% 0.056% 
1993 15.821% 19.894% 20.567% -0.848% 0.176% 
1994 0.677% 0.537% 0.88% -0.298% -0.045% 
1995 0.056% 0.543% 0.073% 0.508% -0.038% 
1996 -0.438% 0.005% -0.569% 0.61% -0.035% 
1997 8.245% 14.347% 10.718% 3.168% 0.461% 
1998 -3.853% 1.415% -5.009% 6.159% 0.265% 
1999 -5.903% -0.774% -7.673% 6.690% 0.209% 
2000 21.91% 19.293% 28.483% -8.968% -0.222% 
2001 18.824% 19.731% 24.472% -4.647% -0.094% 
2002 11.44% 10.608% 14.872% -4.181% -0.083% 
2003 8.511% 10.067% 11.065% -0.939% -0.059% 
2004 15.368% 15.983% 19.979% -3.97% -0.026% 
2005 8.248% 7.911% 10.722% -2.684% -0.128% 
2006 1.236% -1.15% 1.607% -2.789% 0.031% 
2007 0.791% -3.36% 1.029% -4.701% 0.313% 
2008 8.172% 11.515% 10.623% 0.781% 0.11% 
2009 19.245% 19.649% 25.018% -5.1% -0.269% 
2010 6.021% 4.559% 7.827% -3.275% 0.006% 
2011 -0.895% -2.537% -1.164% -1.413% 0.039% 
2012 6.825% 7.804% 8.872% -1.071% 0.003% 
2013 2.430% 2.858% 3.159% -0.291% -0.01% 
2014 3.964% 4.041% 5.153% -1.092% -0.021% 
2015 0.868% 0.889% 1.128% -0.221% -0.017% 
2016 6.018% 6.647% 7.824% -1.156% -0.021% 
2017 3.053% 2.999% 3.969% -0.948% -0.022% 
       
Annual 7.033% 7.754% 9.142% -1.293% -0.095% 
# years of positive contribution 22 22 22 6  
# years outperform  17    
# years underperform   9       
Long C indicates the performance contribution of long portion and the short C indicates the performance contribution of short portion. 
The difference between active contribution of 130/30 TBS are the difference from Long C and Short C (for exemple-0.095%) defined 
as "Interaction", which is caused by the periodic rebalancing between long and short portfolios.  # years of outperformance indicate the 






Table 5. Performance contribution of long top-only portfolio VS 130/30 TBS portfolio  
Table 6. Multi-factor analysis 
 
    Alpha yearly 
Alpha 
monthly Mkt SMB HML Momentum R2 
  Panel A: 3 factor           
  Long only 5.30% 0.004*** 0.976*** 0.093*** 0.317***   0.874 
130/ 30                
  130/30 TB 6.50% 0.005*** 0.97*** 0.121*** 0.336***   0.809 
  130/30 TS 5.90% 0.005*** 0.995*** 0.109*** 0.289***   0.827 
  130/30 TBS 6,00% 0.005*** 0.99*** 0.111*** 0.301***   0.792 
  Panel B: 4 factor           
  Long only 5.80% 0.005*** 0.953*** 0.096*** 0.300*** -0.001*** 0.877 
130/ 30                
  130/30 TB 6.80% 0.006*** 0.952*** 0.124*** 0.322*** 0.000* 0.810 
  130/30 TS 6.30% 0.005*** 0.979*** 0.111*** 0.276*** 0.000* 0.829 
  130/30 TBS 6.30% 0.005*** 0.973*** 0.114*** 0.288*** 0.000* 0.828 
*, **, and **** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The data of 3 factor and 4 factor models was retrieved from Kenneth French´s website and employed one-month US treasury bills as a proxy for 




















The difference between active return of long top-only portfolio and 130/30 TBS
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Table 7. Robustness test 
      
Relative 
return t-dif IR 
Jensen´s 
alpha t-dif Short C. 
Table 7A: 30% and 90% top cut-off of overall ESG 
 30% top cut-offs       
   Long only 7.033%*** - 0.305 0.561%*** -  
   130/30 TBS 7.754%*** - 0.296 0.613%*** - -1.293% 
         
 90% top cut-offs       
   Long only 8.069%*** - 0.395 0.637%*** -  
    130/30 TBS 9.121%*** - 0.401 0.711%*** - -1.293% 
Table 7B: Individual dimension E. S and G 
 E Long-only 7.275%*** - 0.348 0.562%*** -   
   130/30 7.883%*** - 0.335 0.600%*** - -2.187% 
         
 S Long-only 7.147%*** - 0.353 0.554%*** -   
   130/30 6.749%*** - 0.319 0.531%*** - -1.615% 
               
 G Long-only 5.383%*** - 0.210 0.440%*** -   
   130/30 5.089%*** - 0.170 0.436%*** - -1.615% 
                  
Relative return is the annualized compounded return. Information ratios are the arithimetic mean relative return divided by tracking 
error. Jensen´s alpha is on a monthly basis. Short C indicates the performance contribution of the short portion. The t-dif is the t-test 
for the difference between the 130/30 portfolio and the long-top only portfolio.  "-" indicates no statistically significant difference. 
* , **, and **** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
         
 
 
